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CASENOTE
GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH: WHOSE CASTLE IS IT, ANYWAY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.' Generally, a warrant is required
to conduct a lawful search of a person's home, and a warrantless
search is unreasonable per se.2 However, there are some excep-
tions to this requirement.' A warrantless search is reasonable if
police obtain voluntary consent from a person to search their
home or effects. 4 The Supreme Court has also recognized that a
third party with common authority over a household may consent
to a police search affecting an absent co-occupant.5 The Supreme
Court of the United States recently addressed whether third-
party consent was effective as to a present, objecting co-occupant
in Georgia v. Randolph,6 in which a wife granted police permis-
sion to search the marital home over the protestations of her hus-
band, and found that it was not.7
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971)); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
("[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.") (footnotes omitted).
3. Examples include seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, hot pur-
suit, vehicle searches, searches incident to a valid arrest, and consent searches, among
others. See Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure Investigation and Police
Practices, 84 GEO. L.J. 717, 743 (1996).
4. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
5. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
6. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
7. Id. at 1519.
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The rule announced by the majority is murky and will probably
require further refinement. Both the majority and dissenting
opinions failed to recognize the importance of the absent versus
present distinction in reference to Fourth Amendment rights; in-
stead, each opinion is aimed at undermining the other, resulting
in a decision that never fully appreciates the dangers of limiting
the scope of Fourth Amendment protections in favor of expanding
a judicially created exception.' This note examines the Court's
decision in Randolph and its shortcomings. Part II traces the de-
velopment of the third-party consent exception and the different
theories the Court has utilized in justifying its decisions. Part III
discusses the history and background of the Randolph case. Part
IV reports the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, ana-
lyzing weaknesses in each and the interplay between them. Part
V considers the impact the Randolph decision may have on the
law of search and seizure, in light of the problems noted in Part
IV.
II. HISTORY OF THIRD-PARTY CONSENT TO WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Origins, and the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test
The law regarding warrantless search and seizure has under-
gone much change over time; the Randolph decision continues a
tradition of the Court's inconsistent interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.9 The Court held in early third-party consent cases
that persons with an inferior property interest in the searched
premises did not have sufficient authority to authorize a consent
search.1" Later, the Supreme Court's declaration in Katz v.
8. Cf. Nancy J. Kloster, Note, An Analysis of the Gradual Erosion of the Fourth
Amendment Regarding Voluntary Third Party Consent Searches: The Defendant's Perspec-
tive, 72 N.D. L. REV. 99, 106-13 (1996) (criticizing the Court's Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence and tracing its development in the federal system).
9. See generally Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: View-
ing the Supreme Court's Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387 (2003).
10. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (finding that a hotel clerk lacked au-
thority to consent to a search of guest's room); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961) (holding that a landlord did not have authority to consent to a search of tenant's
house, where a distillery was found within).
[Vol. 41:589
GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
United States1 that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places" paved the way for a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in-
dependent of the law of property. 12 Justice Harlan's concurrence
in that case set forth a two-part test for applying the majority's
rule: first, a person must have exhibited a subjective expectation
of privacy; and second, society is prepared to recognize that ex-
pectation as "reasonable."13 This concurring opinion came to be
adopted by many lower courts and eventually the Supreme
Court, 4 and forms the basis of the "touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis": the reasonable expectation of privacy the-
ory. 15
The Court further refined this theory in Rakas v. Illinois,16 ex-
plaining that a reasonable expectation of privacy must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment; either property rights
or notions recognized by society may provide such a basis. 7 The
Rakas Court recognized that in embracing the reasonable expec-
tation test, it was ostensibly abandoning a "thoroughly workable,
'bright line' test in favor of a less certain analysis of whether the
facts of a particular case give rise to a legitimate expectation of
privacy."18
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. Id. at 351, 353 (abrogating the "trespass" paradigm of the Fourth Amendment's
protections in favor of a reasonable expectation of privacy theory).
13. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(b) (4th ed. 2004).
15. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). Justice Harlan himself later as-
serted that the Katz analysis "must ... transcend the search for subjective expectations
or legal attribution of assumptions of risk," because social expectations are largely shaped
by the laws themselves. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
16. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
17. Id. at 143 n.12 ("[B]y focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property con-
cepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that
Amendment.").
18. Id. at 144. The "bright line" referred to here is the test developed in Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), in which the Court found that "anyone legitimately on
premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality." Id. at 267. The Rakas Court's
rationale for rejecting the "legitimately on the premises" test was that the test created too
broad a range of Fourth Amendment rights. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142. Therefore, the Court
concluded, Jones offered only a superficially "bright line" test which had led to inconsistent
results. See id. at 145 n.13 (discussing the widely varying results the Jones test had en-
gendered).
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B. The Assumption of Risk Theory
In United States v. Matlockt 9 the Court qualified the reason-
able expectation of privacy test, holding that third-party consent
searches are reasonable under the theory that a person "assumes
the risk" that a co-occupant with "common authority" over the
premises will admit police to search in his absence.2" The as-
sumption of risk theory as applied to Fourth Amendment cases
originated in the Court's 1969 decision in Frazier v. Cupp,21
where a search of a shared duffel bag was held valid against the
absent co-user of the bag.22 In Matlock, the respondent was ar-
rested in front of the house where he lived and was detained in a
squad car while police officers obtained consent from a woman in-
side the house to search the room she shared with the respon-
dent.23 The search turned up a large sum of cash, and the respon-
dent sought to suppress this evidence by arguing that his
cohabitant's consent was not binding on him.24 However, the
Court held that the government met its burden by showing that
the co-occupant's voluntary consent was legally sufficient,2 5 and
therefore the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.26
The Court's decision in Matlock, which allowed for third-party
consent by a person with "common authority" over a shared prem-
19. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
20. Id. at 170-71.
21. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
22. Id. at 740 ("Petitioner, in allowing [his cousin] to use the bag and in leaving it in
his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that [the cousin] would allow someone
else to look inside.").
23. 415 U.S. at 166, 179.
24. See id. at 166-67. Suppression of evidence gathered in the course of an illegal
search or seizure has been the standard remedy for such unconstitutional searches since
the Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary
rule to searches unconstitutionally undertaken by state officials, incorporating the Fourth
Amendment as binding on states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that use
of illegally seized evidence in federal prosecutions is "a denial of the constitutional rights
of the accused.").
25. That is, the consent was voluntarily given and not the result of duress or coercion.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
26. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177. But see id. at 178-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the lack of a search warrant rendered the search unreasonable, particularly in light




ises, may be viewed as a foreseeable consequence of its decision in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,27 which the Court decided in the term
prior to Matlock.2" Schneckloth provided guidelines for determin-
ing whether warrantless consent searches are reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment: the consent must "in fact [be] voluntarily
given, and not the result of duress or coercion."29 In addition,
"knowledge of a right to refuse [consent] is not a prerequisite of a
voluntary consent."3" The Court accepted the utility of a "totality
of the circumstances" approach in assessing whether any implicit
or explicit coercion had occurred.3' Schneckloth thus clarified the
notion of consent searches and what was necessary for such to be
reasonable.32
C. Post-Matlock, Pre-Randolph Third Party Consent Law
A majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue of third-party
consent expanded Matlock to allow searches to proceed as long as
one occupant gave consent, regardless of whether another occu-
pant objected.33 The Supreme Court itself expanded the Matlock
rule; in Illinois v. Rodriguez34 it held that warrantless third-party
consent searches are valid as long as the third party had "appar-
ent authority" to grant consent to a search.3" This case abrogated
27. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
28. Schneckloth was decided May 29, 1973, during the Court's 1972 term, while
Matlock was decided February 20, 1974, during the Court's 1973 term.
29. 412 U.S. at 248.
30. Id. at 234. The Schneckloth decision reversed a Ninth Circuit rule that for a con-
sent search to be reasonable, the prosecution must prove that the subject of the search had
knowledge of his right to refuse consent. Id. at 229.
31. See id. at 226 (noting Fourth Amendment cases in which the Court took into ac-
count various factors, none of which were necessarily dispositive).
32. Cf 4 LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 8.1(a) (summarizing legal commentators' criticisms
of the Schneckloth decision).
33. See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 n.1 (2006) The Randolph majority
cited four courts of appeals' decisions holding that third-party consent remains effective in
the face of an express objection: United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 533, 536 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Hendrix,
595 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); and United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684,
687-88 (6th Cir. 1977). The Court also noted that a majority of state courts reached the
same conclusion as the federal appellate courts, citing Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 680
(Ark. 2003) and City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-05 (Wyo. 1991)).
34. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
35. Id. at 179-80, 189 (holding a search constitutional where consent was granted by
petitioner's ex-girlfriend, whom police reasonably believed to possess common authority
over the apartment because she had a key and did not indicate to them that she no longer
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the burden of showing that the consenting third party actually
possessed "common authority," as required by Frazier and
Matlock, making it easier for police to conduct warrantless
searches of an absent party's property and demonstrating a will-
ingness of the Court to value police efficiency over an individual's
privacy expectation.36 Justice Marshall explained in his dissent
that under the "assumption of risk" analysis, a search based on
the consent of a third party with apparent, but not actual, author-
ity cannot be reasonable because the subject of the search does
not have a diminished privacy expectation, which is the underly-
ing rationale in cases such as Matlock and Frazier.37 The stark
difference in focus of the majority and dissenting opinions in Rod-
riguez--Justice Scalia's concern was with law enforcement effi-
cacy and practicality,3" while Justice Marshall found this an in-
sufficiently compelling reason to expand an exception to the
general rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable 39-
foreshadowed the outcome in Randolph, in which all of the Jus-
tices authoring opinions demonstrated diverse perspectives on
this tension.
Prior to the Supreme Court of Georgia's Randolph decision,
only four state supreme courts had found third-party consent in-
valid as to a present, objecting co-occupant.4 ° These cases found
that although a consenting party may permit a search in their
lived there).
36. Id. at 186 ("Whether the basis for ... authority [to consent to a search] exists is
the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected
to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it
reasonably."). Cf. id. at 189-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The majority's defense of [its]
position rests on a misconception of the basis for third-party consent searches. That such
searches do not give rise to claims of constitutional violations rests not on the premise that
they are 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, but on the premise that a person may
voluntarily limit his expectation of privacy by allowing others to exercise authority over
his possessions." (citations omitted)).
37. Id. at 193-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 185-86 (holding that all the Fourth Amendment requires is that police be
reasonable in their search, not necessarily correct, because a determination of consent is a
"recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply
their judgment.").
39. Id. at 192 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In the absence of an exigency, then, war-
rantless home searches and seizures are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment....
[O]nly the minimal interest in avoiding the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant weighs
in on the law enforcement side.").
40. Florida, Washington, New York and Minnesota. See, e.g., Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d
559 (Fla. 1977); State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1989).
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own right, it is unreasonable to presume that a co-occupant as-
sumes this risk when present at the shared premises.41 Unlike
the federal appellate decisions, these state courts found the dis-
tinction between the absence and presence of the defendant to be
dispositive because a person's expectation of privacy is greater
when they are at home than when they are not.42 These four
courts were clearly in the minority among those to have consid-
ered the issue.43
None of the Supreme Court's prior third-party consent cases
addressed the issue of whether an evidentiary seizure is lawful
"with the permission of one occupant when the other ... is pre-
sent at the scene and expressly refuses to consent."44 The Court
granted certiorari to address the split among the courts. 45 How-
ever, it is questionable whether Randolph meaningfully resolved
this split. Justice Souter's majority opinion did not clearly enun-
ciate the obvious tension between a Fourth Amendment guaran-
tee to refuse police entry to search without a warrant and the
relatively recent, judicially created exception of third-party con-
sent.46 Instead, the opinion is largely aimed at addressing issues
raised in the dissent written by Chief Justice Roberts. Randolph
was one of the first contentious cases to be decided by the Roberts
Court, and it is evident that the Justices struggled in finding
equilibrium after a long string of unanimous decisions.47
41. See, e.g., Leach, 782 P.2d at 1038-40.
42. See, e.g., id. at 1040.
43. See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 n.1 (2006); supra note 33 and ac-
companying text.
44. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
45. Id. at 1520.
46. See Leach, 782 P.2d at 1038-39 ("'[A] present, objecting party should not have his
constitutional rights ignored because of a leasehold or other property interest shared with
another. This is particularly true where the police are aware that the person objecting is
the one whose constitutional rights are at stake."') (quoting Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d 559,
562-63 (Fla. 1977)).
47. Chief Justice Roberts's dissent referred to "what becomes the majority opinion,"
126 S. Ct. at 1539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), suggesting that his dissent was originally
intended to be the majority opinion. Other animosity is evident as well; Justice Souter
called the dissent's apparent concern for domestic violence a "red herring," id. at 1526,
while Chief Justice Roberts's dissent repeatedly called the majority opinion "random" and
arbitrary." Id. at 1531, 1536-37, 1539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Ste-
vens appear to have written separate opinions solely for the purpose of attacking the
other's conception of constitutional interpretation, though their discussion is better-
natured than the exchange between Justice Souter and Chief Justice Roberts. See gener-
ally David L. Hudson Jr., Fourth Amendment Case Shows Cracks in the Court, 5 No. 12
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III. BACKGROUND OF THE RANDOLPH DECISION
A. Factual Background
Scott and Janet Randolph had been separated for over a
month, with Mrs. Randolph and the couple's son staying with
relatives in Canada before their return to the marital home in
Americus, Georgia, in July 2001.4" Mrs. Randolph sought police
intervention when, following a domestic dispute, she determined
that Mr. Randolph had removed their son without her knowl-
edge.49 Mr. Randolph arrived at the home after the police and ex-
plained that he had taken the boy to a neighbor's house because
he feared his wife would flee to Canada with their son. ° A police
officer went with Mrs. Randolph to retrieve the boy. 1 When they
returned, Mrs. Randolph told the police officer that Mr. Randolph
was a drug user, and that evidence of Mr. Randolph's illegal drug
use could be found in the house.5 2 The police officer asked Mr.
Randolph for "permission to search the house, which he un-
equivocally refused."53 The sergeant then asked Mrs. Randolph,
who gave her consent. 4 Inside the house, Mrs. Randolph led the
police officer to Mr. Randolph's bedroom, where the officer noticed
a piece of a plastic straw and white powdery residue, which he
suspected to be cocaine.55
The police officer left the bedroom to retrieve an evidence bag,
and when he returned to the house, Mrs. Randolph withdrew her
consent.56 The police then obtained a warrant for a full search of
the house, and the subsequent search turned up further evidence
of drug use.57
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2 (2006), available at 5 No. 12 ABAJEREP 2.
48. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519. The statement of facts does not explain whether
Mrs. Randolph's intention in returning was to reconcile with her husband, or merely to













Mr. Randolph was indicted for possession of cocaine on the ba-
sis of evidence collected during the general search of his home.5"
He sought to suppress the drug evidence, claiming that the first
search over his express objection, which provided the probable
cause for the second search, violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.59 The trial court denied the motion, and the Georgia Court
of Appeals reversed on Mr. Randolph's interlocutory appeal.6 ° The
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals's deci-
sion to suppress the evidence, relying on the Supreme Court of
Washington's decision in State v. Leach61 that third-party consent
given by an individual with equal control over the premises re-
mains valid against a cohabitant only as long as the cohabitant is
absent.62 Where the cohabitant is present, that court reasoned,
"the police must also obtain the cohabitant's consent."63 The State
appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.64 The Court
affirmed the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision on the basis
that social expectations provide a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy that should not be overcome by a co-occupant's consent.65
58. Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), affd, 604 S.E.2d 835
(Ga. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
59. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
60. Randolph, 590 S.E.2d at 835-36, affd, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct.
1515 (2006). The Georgia Court of Appeals declined to "expand[ ] [Matlock] in a manner
that is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment," because "[tihis case is both legally and
factually distinguishable from Matlock. Here, Mr. Randolph was not only present, but he
affirmatively exercised his Fourth Amendment right to be free from police intrusion by
refusing to consent to the search of his house." Id. at 837-38 (footnote omitted).
61. 782 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1989).
62. State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006)
(citing Leach, 782 P.2d at 1040).
63. Id. (quoting Leach, 782 P.2d at 1040). The Georgia court's endorsement of the rule
in Leach is probably what led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, since it implied that
police officers must actively seek consent of all present cohabitants, not merely heed any
objection. This stance, though a bright-line rule, is too cumbersome to law enforcement in
the view of most judges and also contravened the Court's holding in Matlock.
64. Georgia v. Randolph, 544 U.S. 973 (2005).
65. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1523 (2006).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Court fractured significantly in deciding Randolph, though
the final outcome was 5-3.66 The Justices authored six separate
opinions, with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Kennedy and Breyer
joining Justice Souter's majority opinion, of whom Justices Ste-
vens and Breyer also wrote concurrences.67 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote a dissent joined by Justice Scalia; Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas also each dissented separately.6"
A. The Majority Decision
1. Mrs. Randolph's Consent was Invalid as to Mr. Randolph
The majority affirmed the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision
to suppress the evidence, holding "that a warrantless search of a
shared dwelling . . . over the express refusal of consent by a
physically present resident cannot be . . . reasonable as to him,"
regardless of consent given by a co-tenant.69 Justice Souter relied
heavily on "widely shared social expectations" of privacy in one's
home in deciding whether the search of Mr. Randolph's house
against his objection was unreasonable and thus violative of the
Fourth Amendment.7" Because no other source of authority, such
as state-law property rights or common contractual arrange-
ments, can offer a common and consistent understanding of au-
thority to admit third parties to a shared premises without the
consent of a co-occupant,71 explained Justice Souter, then it is
proper to turn to social expectations as the "constant element in
assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent
cases."
72
66. Justice Alito did not participate. Id. at 1528.
67. Id. at 1516. Justice Stevens's concurrence and Justice Scalia's dissent are not dis-
cussed at length in this note because they are not relevant to the resolution of the case,
and appear to have been written solely for the sake of aggravating each other over their
fundamental differences in interpreting the Constitution.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1526.
70. Id. at 1521.
71. Id. at 1522.
72. Id. at 1521.
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According to Justice Souter, the common understanding of rea-
sonable privacy is that one occupant will not admit a guest over
another occupant's objection.7" The co-occupant wishing to admit
a guest has "no recognized authority in law or social practice to
prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant."74 Therefore, Jus-
tice Souter concluded that a police officer would have no better
claim to enter than the invited guest. 7 Justice Souter explained
that in many consent-to-search cases, the Court impliedly took
into account what a person's reasonable expectation of privacy
would be in order to determine whether a search was reasonable
as to them.7 6 Since it has always been part of our national under-
standing that "a man's home is his castle," the majority held, dis-
puted consent cannot overcome the privacy protection of the
Fourth Amendment. 7
Justice Souter reached the right decision in Randolph, but
failed to use the strongest reasoning to reach the conclusion that
the search was invalid. The most obvious available argument,
which Justice Souter declined to utilize, is the language of the
Fourth Amendment itself and the importance of interpreting its
protections broadly.78 He only referred to this argument once,7 9
then undermined it by recognizing the competing interests of a
co-occupant's desire to bring criminal activity to light and side
with police in order to insulate oneself from a co-occupant's crimi-
nal activity."0 It was clear to the courts below,8 ' and to a constitu-
73. Id. at 1522.
74. Id. at 1523.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1522 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990) (holding that over-
night houseguests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their temporary quarters
because "it is unlikely that [the host] will admit someone who wants to see or meet with
the guest over the objection of the guest")). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth a two-pronged test considering the search
subject's subjective expectation of privacy and whether that expectation is reasonable).
77. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1524 (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307
(1958)).
78. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) ("In considering [the
State's arguments for validity of the search], we must not lose sight of the Fourth
Amendment's fundamental guarantee."). The Coolidge majority also made an important
point in quoting Justice Bradley's opinion in Boyd v. United States: "'It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon.'" Id. at 454 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
79. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1524.
80. See id.
81. See State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 1515
(2006) (distinguishing Matlock because "'a present, objecting party should not have his
20071
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tionally minded observer, that the Randolph Court was presented
with choosing between expanding the judicially created doctrine
of third-party consent, and protecting the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Yet Justice
Souter's opinion seems to lose sight of the threat to an important
constitutional right, instead choosing to focus on the rebuttable
argument that the search was invalid because of "social expecta-
tions" that if one occupant invited a friend over, and the other oc-
cupant told the invitee to stay out, "no sensible person would go
inside under those conditions." 2
Using "social expectations" as a basis for determining the scope
of the Fourth Amendment has its flaws, and alternative theories
could have been used to support the outcome in this case. An em-
pirical study of social expectations of privacy suggested that
"some of the Court's decisions regarding the threshold of the
Fourth Amendment ... do not reflect societal understandings." 3
Justice Souter's conception of society's "common understanding"
regarding relations between cohabitants' is entirely subjective
and probably impossible to confirm. Furthermore, it is troubling
for the Court to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tections by "social expectations" when, as some jurists have noted,
laws and political systems often shape such expectations in the
first place. 5
constitutional rights ignored... [due to a] property interest shared with another'") (quot-
ing Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d 559, 562 (Fla. 1977)); Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 837
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003), affd, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006) (finding
it "inherently reasonable" to require police to "honor a present occupant's express objection
to a search of his dwelling," and that "common authority" must work both ways: not only
to consent to a search, but also to exercise privacy rights).
82. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522-23.
83. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Pri-
vacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993).
84. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523 (stating that "there is no common understanding
that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of
another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to outsiders").
85. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting);




2. Majority's Disposition of Matlock and Rodriguez
The majority's treatment of Matlock and Rodriguez is lamenta-
ble, 6 as it did not squarely address the issue that brought
Randolph to the Supreme Court docket in the first place: whether
it was constitutional to expand Matlock and Rodriguez well be-
yond absent co-tenants to allow searches against present, object-
ing co-tenants.8 7 Rather than address Matlock and Rodriguez di-
rectly, Justice Souter referred to these cases as "two loose ends"
to be dealt with peripherally at the end of his opinion, after bas-
ing his conclusion on the weak "social expectation" theory. 8
In its attempt to avoid undercutting Matlock, the majority
failed to distinguish "absent" and "present" in any significant
way. This would have been an important distinction to clarify due
to Mr. Matlock's proximity to the house at the time of the
search. 9 Some jurists have described Mr. Matlock as "present" to
suit their purposes in arguing for expansion of the rule to allow a
search against a present objecting resident,9" even though
Matlock resolved the question of whether "the consent of one who
possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as
against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that author-
ity is shared."91 The majority actually perpetuates the confusion
by stating that the defendants in Matlock and Rodriguez were
86. The two cases are discussed together here because they form the body of modern
third-party consent law prior to the Court's decision in Randolph; the facts in the cases
are very similar, with the main difference being that in Rodriguez the defendant's girl-
friend had apparent but not actual authority to consent to a search. Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990). Thus, any decision the Court came to in Randolph affecting
Matlock would also affect Rodriguez, since there is no issue of "apparent authority" in this
case.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding con-
sent to remain effective even against a contemporaneous express objection because of the
Matlock "common authority" rule).
88. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
89. He was in a police car in the front yard of the house. United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 166, (1974).
90. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1534 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that the
searches in Matlock and Rodriguez were reasonable because the third parties had author-
ity, and apparent authority, respectively, "to admit others into areas over which they exer-
cised control, despite the almost certain wishes of their present co-occupants"); Morning,
64 F.3d at 534-35 (discussing United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir.
1977), in which the court declared that "the fact of the defendant's presence made no dif-
ference because the defendant in Matlock was present in the front yard").
91. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added).
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
"not far away." " This description weakens the majority's argu-
ment and makes the holding so narrow as to resolve little of the
ambiguity remaining from the Matlock and Rodriguez decisions.
3. Majority's Opinion as a Reaction to Dissent's Accusations
Justice Souter allowed the dissent to shape the context of his
opinion instead of relying on straightforward, Constitution- and
precedent-based arguments to support the outcome. Most of his
responses to Chief Justice Roberts's concerns in limiting the
"common authority" third-party consent rule are unpersuasive.
He never clearly asserted that the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tion of privacy in one's home should be paramount to police expe-
diency,93 nor that the "exigent circumstances" exception could suf-
fice to allow for warrantless searches when truly necessary. 94 His
approach to dealing with the dissent's charge that his rule will
shield spousal abusers, suggesting that fearful occupants can
simply go outside to be within protective police custody, is practi-
cal but not particularly appealing.95
Justice Souter and Chief Justice Roberts were not the only two
Justices to trade pointed remarks in this case to the detriment of
the clarity of the holding. Incidental to the important Fourth
Amendment issues posed by the case, Justices Stevens and Scalia
engaged in a lively debate over proper originalist interpretation of
the Constitution. Justice Stevens claimed that "if 'original under-
92. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527. Consider also that Randolph is the first time
such a case has reached the Supreme Court; since it is fairly rare for a contemporaneous
consent dispute to occur between two residents with common authority over the premises,
this decision does little to affect consent-to-search jurisprudence generally.
93. See id. at 1524 (discussing an individual's interest in bringing criminal activity to
light or deflecting suspicion from oneself when sharing quarters with a criminal and stat-
ing that "society can often have the benefit of these interests without relying on a theory of
consent that ignores an inhabitant's refusal to allow a warrantless search.").
94. See id. at 1525. It would have been more straightforward to explain that justice,
and society, are better served when a warrant "is the rule rather than the exception."
Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834, 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), affd, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga.
2004), affd, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
95. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526 ("In the circumstances of those cases, there is no
danger that the fearful occupant will be kept behind the closed door of the house simply
because the abusive tenant refuses to consent to a search."). Justice Souter discussed cases
cited by the dissent, noting that in many of the consent cases involving domestic abuse
victims, the victim was either not present at the time of the police arrival, or the police
were able to enter on the basis of the "exigent circumstance" exception without securing
consent from the abuser. See id.
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standing' were to govern the outcome of this case, the search was
clearly invalid because the husband did not consent," since at the
time of the Fourth Amendment's ratification the husband's deci-
sion to consent to a search or refuse would control over his
wife's.96 Justice Scalia, of course, did not let this go unanswered,
claiming that the effect of the Randolph decision is to give men
the power to prevent women from allowing police to enter a
shared home, which is "precisely the power that Justice Stevens
disapprovingly presumes men had in 179 1.
"97
The contentious nature of the Randolph opinions may be a
harbinger of a bitterly divided Court to come, one with ideologi-
cally entrenched Justices whose positions reflect the growing po-
larization in American political culture. Although the Roberts
Court handed down a slightly higher than average percentage of
unanimous opinions in its first term, 9 Randolph exhibits the un-
raveling of Chief Justice Roberts's minimalist ideal. 99  In
Randolph, the Court was presented with a difficult case requiring
interpretation of inconsistent prior case law. Despite being de-
cided on extremely narrow grounds, the Justices' Randolph opin-
ions amount to personal attacks, to the detriment of the jurispru-
dence they are simultaneously creating. This contentiousness
certainly undermined the force of the majority opinion here.
B. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer's brief concurrence suggests that he may have
originally planned to join the Chief Justice.100 He chose to side
with the majority after "examining the totality of the circum-
96. Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 1541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court's Helm, but He Isn't Yet in Control, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2006, § 1, at 1.
99. See Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., The Minimalist; Chief Justice Roberts Favors Nar-
row Court Rulings That Create Consensus and Tolerate Diversity, L.A. TIMES, May 25,
2006, at Bl (discussing Chief Justice Roberts's commencement address at Georgetown
University Law Center, in which the Chief Justice argued "in favor of unanimous or near-
unanimous opinions, which... serve the rule of law" by preventing the Court's "internal
divisions" from clouding the Court's message, and which tend to ensure that each case is
decided on narrow, fact-specific grounds).
100. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1529 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that if he had to
choose between "a rule that always found one tenant's consent sufficient," and "a rule that
never did," he would choose the first).
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stances" of the factual situation, an important analysis disre-
garded by the majority. 1 1 He argued that using a "totality of the
circumstances" analysis would prevent the majority's ruling from
having an adverse affect on victims of spousal abuse, 10 2 because
"were the circumstances to change significantly, so should the re-
sult."1 0
3
Justice Breyer's conclusion that "the 'totality of the circum-
stances' present here do not suffice to justify abandoning the
Fourth Amendment's traditional hostility to police entry into a
home without a warrant" is well-founded and concise because it
takes into account the fact that Mr. Randolph was present and
objecting. °4 The best argument for the majority's position is that
the Fourth Amendment should prevail over a judicially created
abrogation of its protection; Justice Breyer alluded to it here
without becoming mired in the sociological puffery Justice Souter
uses to justify the majority position. 105 The "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test that Justice Breyer would use does not directly
address Matlock and Rodriguez, but it is a judicially applicable
test that would prevent law enforcement abuses in warrantless
searches.
101. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Both Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49
(1973), and Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996), ruled that a court must take into ac-
count the "totality of the circumstances" in deciding whether a consent search was reason-
able or not. Because these cases are still good law, the test is valid and could have made
for a stronger argument than "social expectations," while avoiding any bright-line test that
could be arbitrarily applied and potentially infringe upon Fourth Amendment rights.
102. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("In [the] context [of domes-
tic abuse], an invitation (or consent) would provide for immediate, rather than later, police
entry. And entry following invitation or consent by one party ordinarily would be reason-
able even in the face of direct objection by the other. That being so... today's decision will
not adversely affect ordinary law enforcement practices."). The majority. opinion made its
most forceful argument to this effect in a footnote, stating that "if a rule crediting consent
over denial of consent were built on hoping to protect household victims, it would distort
the Fourth Amendment with little, if any, constructive effect on domestic abuse investiga-
tions."Id. at 1526 n.7.
103. Id. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
105. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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C. Chief Justice Roberts's Dissent
1. Assumption of Risk as a Basis for Validity of Consent
The Chief Justice derived his principal argument for allowing a
warrantless search against an objecting co-occupant from his in-
terpretation of Matlock: co-occupants "'assume[ ] the risk that one
of their number might permit [a] common area to be searched."' 10 6
Chief Justice Roberts explained that this is a more sound predi-
cate on which to base a decision, because "a wide variety of differ-
ing social situations can readily be imagined, giving rise to quite
different social expectations," and "[siuch shifting expectations
are not a promising foundation on which to ground a constitu-
tional rule, particularly because the majority has no support" for
its assumption that an invited guest would flee the premises if
told by another occupant to leave. 1o7
Though Justice Souter asserted in the majority opinion that
"widely shared social expectations" are a "constant element in as-
sessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness," ' Chief Justice
Roberts refuted this claim, explaining that the social expectation
analysis has historically only been used in deciding whether "a
search has occurred and whether a particular person has stand-
ing to object to a search" in the first place, not in determining
whether the consent itself was valid.10 9 However, the Chief Jus-
tice's own argument falls somewhat flat in his repeated state-
ments that "[i]f an individual shares information, papers, or
places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person
will . ..share access" to such information, papers, or places. 10
This is unpersuasive because he offers no authority for the propo-
sition that the Constitution no longer protects an individual "once
privacy has been shared."
11
'
106. Id. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
167, 171 n.7 (1974)).
107. Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1521 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)).
109. Id. at 1532-33 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Rakas actually rejected using the
Fourth Amendment as a means for determining standing, finding that "the better analysis
forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept
of standing." 439 U.S. at 139.
110. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1533 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts invoked the language
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Thus, Chief Justice Roberts's reasoning would expand the
Matlock "assumption of risk" theory to the point where it deci-
mates the Fourth Amendment protections of the ninety percent of
Americans who live with one or more other individuals.112 This
would be a fallacy, because the authority for the "assumption of
risk" argument does not suggest that a present, objecting co-
occupant surrenders his ability to object to a warrantless search
merely by deciding to live with another person. 113
2. Matlock Should Not Be Limited Because It Is a Clear Rule
In the Chief Justice's view, under Matlock, the government
may "'show that permission to search was obtained from a third
party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient re-
lationship to the premises'," and the majority's holding would cre-
ate "an exception to this otherwise clear rule."114 Chief Justice
Roberts missed the irony that the "clear rule" he would interpret
so broadly is itself an exception to the Fourth Amendment's guar-
antee against unreasonable (i.e., warrantless) searches. Amaz-
ingly, the Chief Justice's dissent suggests that the Matlock rule is
"clear" 1'-which it must not have been, for the Court to have
granted certiorari in this case1 6-while simultaneously disre-
of the Fourth Amendment in his assertion, but he did not cite it; nor did he cite any au-
thority for his claim that sharing such "information, documents, or places" renders the
Fourth Amendment impotent. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112. See FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY A-44 tbl.13 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf (noting that of the 281 million people in the United States, 27
million live alone).
113. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) (limiting its holding
by noting that "we do not reach another major contention of the United States . . . : that
the Government in any event had only to satisfy the [court below] that the searching offi-
cers reasonably believed that Mrs. Graff had sufficient authority over the premises to con-
sent to the search."). See also supra note 90 and accompanying text, discussing the Chief
Justice's claims that the defendants in Matlock and Rodriguez were present. This is a se-
mantic matter which should have been dealt with more directly by the majority in order to
resolve once and for all the debate over whether the defendants in these cases were "pre-
sent" or "absent." It seems evident that the more important characteristic shared by these
defendants is that neither objected to the search at the time consent was granted-but
that was by reason of their absence from the "threshold colloquy," for presumably they
would have objected had they been present.
114. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S.
at 171).
115. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
116. Consider that the Court that granted certiorari is different from the Court that
[Vol. 41:589
GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
garding the text of the Fourth Amendment itself. 117 Matlock is
only "clear" if one misconstrues it to apply to present defendants
as well as the absent defendants at whom the ruling was origi-
nally aimed, as the Chief Justice did here. 118
It does not necessarily follow from Matlock, even taking the
Chief Justice's broad reading of that case, that an individual re-
linquishes his entire "expectation of privacy" merely by cohabitat-
ing with other individuals.119 Although there is merit in the dis-
sent's contention that "social expectations" are not the best basis
on which to decide this case, the dissent's use of the social prob-
lem of domestic violence to aggrandize police power at the ex-
pense of individual privacy rights is equally problematic.
3. Domestic Violence Concerns
Chief Justice Roberts's dissent expressed concern that the ma-
jority's ruling would have a serious consequence in domestic
abuse situations.12 ° He reasoned that the majority rule, by giving
veto power to an objecting co-occupant over a resident who con-
sents to a search, ignored the fact that "it is her castle, too" and
the consenting co-occupant would suffer retribution when the po-
lice leave without conducting a search. 121
The majority responded to this charge by properly characteriz-
ing the domestic violence issue as a "red herring." '22 Both sides
acknowledged that domestic violence is a major problem in this
country and has been a factor in several consent-to-search
cases.123 But according to the majority, "[t]he undoubted right of
the police to enter in order to protect a victim ... has nothing to
decided this case.
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...").
118. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1534 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (characterizing the
Matlock and Rodriguez defendants as "present").
119. Although Chief Justice Roberts asserted that "shared living space entails a limited
yielding of privacy to others, and.., the law historically permits those to whom we have
yielded our privacy to in turn cooperate with the government," he offered no supporting
authority for this claim. Id. at 1536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1538 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1526.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1992).
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do with the question in this case," 12 4 because of the distinction be-
tween police entry to search for evidence and police entry to pro-
tect a fearful occupant. Thus, the police may always lawfully en-
ter a dwelling over a co-occupant's objection in order to provide
protection.125 This is the better view of this pseudo-issue, which
unfortunately distracted the Court from addressing the real is-
sues at hand: whether or not to expand Matlock, and distinguish-
ing "present" from "absent." As Justice Breyer sensibly noted, the
exigent circumstance exception, rather than the consent excep-
tion, would render a warrantless search reasonable in a domestic
violence event. 126
D. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas analyzed the third-party consent issue in
Randolph not in the "widely shared social expectations" paradigm
of the majority or the expansive interpretation of "assumption of
risk" favored by the Chief Justice in his dissent; instead, Justice
Thomas would resolve this case by avoiding Matlock and Rodri-
guez entirely. 127 He relied on Coolidge v. New Hampshire,2 '
where the defendant's wife invited two police officers into her
home and gave them four of her husband's guns as well as some
clothes in an effort to clear suspicion of her husband's involve-
ment in a murder. 129 That Court found that the wife's actions, in
the absence of any coercion by the police, did not constitute a
"search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.13 ° Applying
Coolidge, Justice Thomas believed that no Fourth Amendment
search occurred in Mr. Randolph's case, rendering Matlock and
Rodriguez inapplicable. 1 31
124. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526.
125. See id. at 1525; see also 4 LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 8.3(d) (proposing that an
emergency situation, such as victimization of one occupant by another, is a valid basis for
a warrantless search, even if the abuser objects to the search).
126. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring).
127. See id. at 1541 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
129. See id. at 486.
130. See id. at 487-90 (finding that defendant's wife was not acting as an instrument of
the state when she produced evidence incriminating her husband).
131. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1541 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas erred in his analysis because he ignored the
fact that the defendant in Coolidge was absent, while Mr.
Randolph was present and actively objecting to the warrantless
search. The Chief Justice's dissent is also guilty of ignoring the
critical fact that Mr. Randolph actively sought to assert his
Fourth Amendment rights, 13 2 and both Justices were too quick to
extend distinguishable situations to the instant case.
V. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE RANDOLPH DECISION
Although Chief Justice Roberts accused the majority's ruling of
being "arbitrary"'33 and "random,"134 the majority decision in
Randolph is clear-cut but narrow: police must heed the objections
of a co-occupant to a warrantless search, even when another co-
occupant consents. This apparently bothered the Chief Justice
because the rule would protect "a co-occupant who happens to be
at the front door when the other occupant consents to a search,
but not one napping ... in the next room."3 5 Justice Souter ad-
mitted that it is a formalistic rule, but contended that "there is
practical value in the simple clarity of complementary rules, one
recognizing the co-tenant's permission when there is no fellow oc-
cupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fel-
low occupant's contrary indication when he expresses it." 136 In
Justice Souter's view, the Court's decision prevents the burden on
police of taking "affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting
co-tenant" before conducting a consent search.1 37 Unfortunately,
Justice Souter did not respond to the "arbitrary" and "random"
accusations with the argument that there is nothing "arbitrary"
or "random" about an individual's contemporaneous, verbal at-
tempt to exercise his Fourth Amendment right against unreason-
able search and seizure. Conceding the majority's rule as "formal-
istic" and assuaging fears of overburdening police efforts gives
credence to the Chief Justice's allegations. Justice Souter should
132. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
133. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1527 (referring to Matlock and suggesting that it can live side-by-side with
the Court's decision in Randolph).
137. Id.
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have simply referred to the most distinguishing facts in this case:
Scott Randolph's presence, and his unequivocal refusal to consent
to a search of his home. Perhaps lower courts will do this for him,
having been given a basis with this holding to flesh out the
Court's inconsistent prior treatment of third-party consent and to
acknowledge the difference between objecting and absent occu-
pants.
It does not appear that the majority's opinion will cause a
"complete lack of practical guidance for the police in the field, let
alone for the lower courts" as the Chief Justice charged. 3 ' The
holding in Randolph simply requires that police honor a present,
objecting resident's refusal of consent to search without a warrant
by obtaining a warrant. It does leave open, however, the question
of what police should do where one co-occupant objects to a war-
rantless search but two or more co-occupants consent. 139
Randolph presented a "tie" between individuals with common au-
thority over the home;14° will the objecting co-occupant win even
when the disputed consent is not a "tie"?
Two recent consent-to-search cases demonstrate how narrow
and distinguishable the Court's ruling in Randolph is. In Casteel
v. State,' the Supreme Court of Nevada found that a consent
search of the defendant's gym bag was valid because the defen-
dant, though physically present, did not object to the search and
therefore Randolph had no bearing on the outcome.142 Similarly,
the Court of Appeals of Indiana distinguished Randolph in Starks
v. State, 4 3 in which an elderly homeowner had consented to a
search of her house, because the defendant was not physically
present at the time the homeowner granted consent, nor did he
138. Id. at 1539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1526 n.8 (dismissing the dissent's criticism of the majority's failure to ad-
dress such a situation: "We decide the case before us, not a different one.").
140. It is arguable whether Janet Randolph had common authority over the home that
was searched, because she had not lived there for over a month, and the home was not
jointly owned by the couple but rather Scott Randolph rented the home from his parents.
See id. at 1519; Brief for the Respondent at 2, Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (No. 04-1067).
Because Rodriguez held that one with "apparent authority" could consent to a search, 497
U.S. 177, 187-89 (1990), Mrs. Randolph's actual interest would not have had a bearing on
the outcome of the case.
141. 131 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2006).
142. Id. at 2.
143. 846 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
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object to the search when it commenced.'44 Thus, two factors will
be dispositive in future cases: "presence" or "absence" at the time
of the request for consent, and whether or not the subject of the
search actually refused consent at that time, 145 though the major-
ity opinion addressed these issues only tangentially. 146
The Court decided another Fourth Amendment case, Hudson v.
Michigan,147 in the same term as Randolph, this time with all
nine Justices participating. Hudson posed the question of
whether police violation of the "knock and announce" rule 4 ' re-
quires suppression of all evidence found in the search. 149 The
Court had decided in Wilson v. Arkansas5 ° that the "knock and
announce" rule was required by the Fourth Amendment. 15 1 Yet
the Hudson majority found that the high social cost of allowing
criminals to go free on the basis of indiscriminate application of
the exclusionary rule outweighed the Fourth Amendment inter-
ests at stake, 152 because "the police would have executed the war-
rant they had obtained, and would have discovered" the evidence
regardless of how long they waited at the door before entering. 153
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that while the ex-
clusionary rule is appropriate in cases of warrantless search,
"[t]he interests protected by the knock-and-announce require-
144. Id. at 682 n. 1. The court also found that the defendant had standing to contest the
validity of the search because he had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the basement
of the home where he was staying. Id. at 678-79.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192-93 (D. Kan. 2006)
(finding that because the defendant did not clearly and unequivocally refuse consent, the
court would not have extended Randolph to this case had defendant raised it); Casteel, 131
P.3d at 4 (requiring defendant be present and object).
146. Justice Souter referred to the event of a police request for consent to search with-
out a warrant as the "threshold colloquy," and made clear that the rule of Randolph would
be applicable only at this fleeting moment. Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1527
(2006).
147. 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000) (codifying the common law requirement that police
entering a home to execute a search warrant must give notice of their purpose and author-
ity before breaking open a door or window).
149. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.
150. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
151. Id. at 929.
152. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.
153. Id. at 2164.
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ment are quite different-and do not include the shielding of po-
tential evidence from the government's eyes." 54
Hudson offers a good contrast to Randolph because whether
the evidence seized in the Randolph's home was admissible was
never seriously debated; instead, the threshold issue was whether
a warrantless search was reasonable in light of disputed consent.
Thus in Randolph, the evidence seizure resulted directly from the
police entry into the home, which the Court decided was unrea-
sonable. But in Hudson, "the interests that were violated ... have
nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence," rendering the ex-
clusionary rule inapplicable. 5 The cases share some common
strands, however. First, Justice Scalia was equally dismissive of
the harm caused by violations of the Fourth Amendment in both
cases.' 56 Also, both cases suffer from the confusion in applying
and interpreting a vastly inconsistent body of prior case law.'57 It
is troubling that the Court relied heavily on the fact that the po-
lice in Hudson possessed a warrant in denying application of the
exclusionary rule, while they accorded the lack of a warrant in
Randolph so little weight.' 8 It would appear that the Court over-
emphasized the importance of the warrant in withholding Fourth
Amendment protection in Hudson while minimizing its impor-
tance in Randolph. In light of the general unpredictability of the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, perhaps this result is
not so surprising.
154. Id. at 2165.
155. Id.
156. Compare id. at 2164-65, with Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1527 (2006).
157. Additionally, Justice Scalia's opinion in Hudson seemed aimed at antagonizing
Justice Stevens, who dissented; at three points in the majority opinion he quoted Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (holding that
evidence seized during an illegal entry was admissible because there was an independent
source for a search warrant), in order to support his argument for denying suppression of
the evidence. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164, 2168, 2169 n.1.
158. Cf. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 190-92 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). These dis-
sents argued that in the absence of either a warrant or an exigency, searches of a home
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--even if the police believe they obtained




The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Randolph demonstrates
the Court's willingness to uphold Matlock's third-party consent,
but not against present, objecting co-occupants. This ruling abro-
gated rules adopted in many jurisdictions that had allowed con-
sent searches to proceed even against the objections of persons
whose constitutional rights were at stake. Randolph thus does
not limit Matlock itself, but protects individuals' Fourth Amend-
ment rights against further expansion of that rule.
This case is notable for the fundamental difference in the ma-
jority and dissent approaches to third-party consent searches,
with Justice Souter using "widely shared social expectations" of
privacy in one's own home, and Chief Justice Roberts using the
"assumption of risk" theory to find that anyone who shares a liv-
ing space is giving up his right to have his objection to a war-
rantless search mean anything. As one commentator noted,
"[elach construction is both true and misleading." '159 The result of
this clash in interpretation of the issue presented is an unpersua-
sive outcome for what should have been a constitutionally dic-
tated result. It might have been clear to the Justices that the
Fourth Amendment should supersede any judicially created ex-
ception to it, but here that conclusion is obscured by the conten-
tion among them. If the issue were to come to the Court again, it
would be wise to reconsider Justice Breyer's approach, as well as
the wise words of Justice Bradley in the Court's first major
Fourth Amendment case,16° Boyd v. United States:'6' "It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."' 62
Lesley McCall
159. Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Re-
lationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1642 (1987).
160. Urbonya, supra note 9, at 1397.
161. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
162. Id. at 635.
20071

